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For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonish-
ing number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated
a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western
European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess
their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own
rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,
with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow
for flexible politics and participatory government?
The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative
that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story
concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the sup-
plementary story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual
baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has
become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,
the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in gen-
eral, and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.1
This paper began life as a series of introductory and concluding comments at a conference
organised by the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) in
Leiden on ÒIslam and the Electoral ProcessÓ, 10Ð12 December 1999, convened by Martin van
Bruinessen. I am very grateful to ISIMÕs Academic Director, Muhammad Khalid Masud, for his
kind invitation to participate in this meeting and his patience in waiting for the revised text,
and to Martin van Bruinessen for his support and encouragement. I have drawn on the
informed insights of the conference participants. I am also grateful to Laurence Whitehead at
whose Seminar on Democratisation at Nuffield College, Oxford, a version of this paper was
presented, 16 May 2000. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of several colleagues:
Paul Dresch, John Gurney, Eric Hooglund, Gaelle Le Pottier, and Yahya Michot.
1 . A voluminous literature has already appeared. Those arguing for IslamÕs compatibility with
democracy include John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996). Elie Kedourie has argued against the proposition in Democracy and Arab
Political Culture (London: Frank Cass, 1994), as has Martin Kramer, ÒIslam and DemocracyÓ, in
Kramer, Arab Awakening & Islamic Revival; The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East (New Brunswick,
New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1996), pp. 265Ð278. 
Those who argue that Islam and democracy are antithetical build their analy-
sis on the supposed uniqueness of Muslim societiesÑthey are not like other soci-
eties or, perhaps more to the point, not like Western societiesÑand on what
Leonard Binder has called Òthe cluster of absencesÓ. In this view, the absence of
a concept of citizenship and of a legal-political culture of compromise and flexi-
bility marks a critical deficiency.2 In some accounts, the absence of fair and free
elections is also seen as a prime indicator of the lack of democratic development. 
The theoretical literature on democratisation is unanimous on one pointÑ
that an intimate connection exists between democracies and elections.3 As the
antithesis of autocracy, democracy is the rule of the people, but they, naturally,
cannot govern directly or as a whole. The pragmatic way out of this problem is
representation, and it follows in turn that representatives (here including
rulers) are chosen in periodic expressions of popular will. But debate persists as
to whether these elections must necessarily embody majoritarianismÑwhat
Alexis de Tocqueville in his great nineteenth-century study of Democracy in Amer-
ica called the Òabsolute sovereignty of the majorityÓÑor serve as a conduit for
diffuse elementsÑwhat G. Bingham Powell calls the Òproportional visionÓ.4
The question of electoral participation is thus complex, and a quick glance at
the Middle East indicates that it is especially so given that notions of democracy
and popular sovereignty will have seemed less entrenched than narrowly based
regimes. Yet substantive electoral politics have, to a certain extent, also emerged
in the region. Elections have occurred with regularity in Turkey and Iran; and, in
the Arab world, in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Kuwait, and Yemen. Beyond
the Middle East, they have long formed part of the political landscape of Pakistan,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Senegal, and Muslim minorities have become
actively engaged in the electoral politics of Europe, America, and Australia.
Despite common expectations, IslamistsÑMuslims who are committed to politi-
cal action to implement what they regard as an Islamic agendaÑhave routinely
participated in most of these elections. They have engaged in the kind of tactical
political calculations that are common to other groups.
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2 . Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 225. 
3 . See, for example: ÒIntroductionÓ, Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds.),
Democracy, Accountability and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
p p . 1Ð4; and Jos Antonio Cheibub and Adam Przeworski, ÒDemocracy, Elections, and
Accountability for Economic OutcomesÓ, in i b i d ., pp. 222Ð223. 
4 . G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 5Ð7, quotation at p. 5. 
It is clear, however, that in terms of government intervention, the degree of
enfranchisement, the extent to which alternation of power occurs, and the fair-
ness of the electoral process itself, none of these elections would rank particu-
larly high. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens have highlighted three crite-
ria of democracy: repeated elections without restriction of race, gender, or class;
accountability of institutions to the electorate; and guarantees of freedom of
expression, association and of individual rights.5 It is obvious that by these stan-
dards, democracy has a long way to go before it could be said to be entrenched
in most parts of the Muslim world.
The purpose of this work is to engage with a specific dimension of the general
debate on democracy and IslamÑcommitment to the electoral principle. It would
be inappropriate to assume that substantive or ÒdeepÓ democratisation is occur-
ringÑor even that it will necessarily follow from the electoral experience that has
been unfolding.6 Many obstacles stand in the way of such development, not least
the embedded power and the anti-pluralist ideology of narrowly based govern-
ments. Be that as it may, a newer, relatively more open form of politics has
emerged for three reasons. First, the nature of opposition and the fragmentation
of authority in the Muslim world are encouraging an instrumental attachment to
the electoral process. Second, a discursive shift has also occurred, and a normative
commitment has emerged, that validates the very concept of elections. Third, the
experience of elections has initiated a potentially reinforcing, though by no means
certain, learning process. Elections, then, may not lead inevitably to democratisa-
tion in the Muslim world, but they are increasingly a force to be reckoned with. 
Op p o s i t i o n  an d F r ag m e n ta t i o n
The starting point of analysis must be that the state has, to a large extent, been pat-
rimonial and authoritarian throughout the Muslim Middle East. Often based on
narrowly communal rather than ideological affinities, regimes seek to maintain
their own cohesion and the acquiescence of society by a policy of repression, co-
3
5 . Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development &
D e m o c r a c y (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 43Ð44.
6 . In fairness, it should be noted that even in more established democracies the linkage between
elections and democratic accountability is not certain. See, for example, Cheibub and
Przeworski, ÒDemocracy, Elections, and Accountability for Economic OutcomesÓ, pp. 222Ð239;
and Powell, Elections as Instruments of Democracy.
optation, and the maintenance of patron-client relations. Autonomous centres of
powerÑpredominantly Islamic onesÑare seen as a threat, and the writ of the state
purports to be comprehensive. In this situation, opposition to the regime auto-
matically takes the form of appealing to what the state is notÑi.e., participatory.
Putting the point slightly differently, because the state has appropriated econom-
ic capital, opponents attempt to usurp Òmoral capitalÓ.7 Electoral politics are the
antithesis of authoritarian, patrimonial politics, and Islamists, rather than auto-
matically standing as critics outside the system, are intimately involved in it. They
are able to offer themselves at once as the proponents of change and the standard
bearers of tradition and probity. They fight on terrain where the narrow ruling cir-
cles are most vulnerable. To paraphrase Charles Tripp8, there is a secular logic to
opposition by which elections assume an instrumental importance even for reli-
giously defined groups. Self-interest, to put it baldly, is self-interest regardless of
the proponents; and calculated choice often explains social action notwithstanding
the level of ideological commitment.
But this utilitarian explanation provides only part of the picture. Contemporary
Islam is characterised by a fragmentation of authority, a contest over who speaks
for Islam. The religious bureaucracy and official »ulama (religious scholars) find
themselves in competition with unofficial or popular religious leaders and preach-
ers, Sufi movements, Islamist groups, and lay intellectuals. All of these and others
claim direct access to Scripture, purport to interpret its contemporary meaning,
and thus effectively question whether any one individual or group has a monopoly
on the sacredÑeven as they appropriate that right for themselves. The result is, on
the one hand, the radicalisation of Islam, the resorting to violence in an attempt
to outbid oneÕs Muslim opponents and certify oneÕs pre-eminent right to speak for
Islam. On the other hand, there is a de facto structural pluralism in this fragmen-
tation. As rational actors, these groups quickly appreciate that, as they are unable
to dominate over the others, they must compromise and engage in the give-and-
take of electoral politics common everywhere. Bargaining and democratic proce-
dures validate themselves as ways to contain or resolve social conflict, and are not
morally desirable ends in themselves. Not out of ideological commitment or virtue,
then, but because of a sober calculation of interests comes the turn to electoral pol-
4
7 . Nazih N. Ayubi, ÒIslam and DemocracyÓ, in David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh and
Paul Lewis (eds.), D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), p. 363.
8 . Charles Tripp, ÒIslam and the Secular Logic of the State in the Middle EastÓ, in Abdel Salam
Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder and Oxford:
Westview Press, 1996), pp. 51Ð69.
itics. In this interpretation, the search for constituencies leads to a kind of broad-
ening of oneÕs appeal and moderation. Coalitions are one obvious consequence,
dictated in part by the peculiarities of the electoral system. Examples include
Hizbullah in Lebanon needing to work with its Shi»i competitor AMAL and even
non-Muslim groups from the late 1990s, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
fielding candidates with the New Wafd and Labour parties in 1984 and 1987. Con-
strained by government on the national level, Islamist groups often find local,
grassroots organisation fertile ground on which to operate.
Another factor that works towards enhancing the opening of the political order,
and even moderation, is the fact that the ÒMuslim voteÓ is scarcely monolithic, and
self-designated Islamist groups do not automatically have a monopoly on it. In
Turkey, for instance, the Refah Party was constrained in part by the fact that
Islamist support went to such supposedly secular parties as True Path and Moth-
erland. Yet it must also be remembered that the imperative of seeking constituen-
cies has a built-in check on fragmenting pluralismÑthe need to appease a core con-
stituency. If a group such as Refah was pushed towards accommodationism, it was
pulled towards an ideologically distinctive agenda by the insistent demands of its
die-hard supporters.
Opposition and fragmentation are thus powerful forces. They may well work in
favour of intensified competition and against the democratic ethos, but it is also
possible that they will provide the initial impulse towards electoral politics. In
effect, they provide both utilitarian9 and structural10 explanations, which have an
established place in democratic theory and which in common assume that a cul-
tural commitment to democratic norms is either not necessary or improbable in
the near future. In short, they hold out for the possibility of a democracy without
democrats whereby the logic of electoral engagement, not its spirit, is sufficient.11
5
9 . See, for example, Richard J. Arneson, ÒDemocratic Rights at National and Workplace LevelsÓ,
i n David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer (eds.), The Idea of Democracy ( C a m b r i d g e :
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 118Ð148. Stathis N. Kalyvas, in a probing essay, argues
that democratic development is initially dependent on Òstrategic self-interest rather than
normative commitmentÓ: ÒDemocracy and Religious Politics: Evidence from BelgiumÓ,
Comparative Political Studies, 31, no. 3 (June 1998), p. 293. 
1 0 . See, for example, Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in
Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
1 1 . John Waterbury, ÒDemocracy Without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in
the Middle EastÓ, in Ghassan Salam (ed.), Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in
the Muslim World (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 43Ð45. Also see ÒIntroduction: Where are the
Democrats?Ó, especially pp. 16Ð20. 
N o r m at i v e  C ha nge  
The question of whether Muslims, especially politically active Islamists, inter-
nalise their adoption of electoral politics is, however, one that repeatedly appears
in discussions on the subject. Indeed, a leitmotif in the argument of those who
see an incompatibility between Islam and democracy, or at least between
Islamists and democracy,1 2 is that electoral commitment is only tactical and cyn-
icalÑÒone person, one vote, one timeÓ.1 3 My own interpretation is that Muslims
have, to some extent, accepted the normative framework of elections, but in
order to assess the degree of this commitment historical and theoretical devel-
opments need to be taken into account.
Development of the Electoral Principle
Contrary to what may be assumed, the roots of elections reach into the nine-
teenth century. The first stirrings were detected in the 1830s in Egypt and Crete
where local councils with both Muslim and non-Muslim members were created.
The concept and limited practice came into their own, however, during the
Ottoman empire of the Tanzimat period in the nineteenth century. In part influ-
enced by reforming, Europhile bureaucrats and in part constrained by the
unwanted interest of the Great Powers, the imperial government issued a series
of edicts that opened the door to political experimentation of a kind hitherto not
seen in the empires of the Muslim world. The Hatt-õ Humayun of Glhane (1839)
did not promise parliamentary government, but it did proclaim the rights of all
subjects under, and their equality before, the law. The principle of representation
was first recognised in a f i r m a n (edict) of January 1840 whereby, in addition to the
abolition of tax-farming, administrative councils were established in the major
districts of the empire. Of the thirteen members in the large urban councils, six
were appointed by the government, but of greater importance was the fact that
6
1 2 . I. William Zartman, ÒDemocracy and Islam: The Cultural DialecticÓ, The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 524 (November 1992), p. 189.
1 3 . Bassam Tibi, for example, says he agrees with the Democratic Movements in the Middle East
Project which concluded that Islamists are Òcommitted to using the fragile reemergence of
democratic processes to destroy any decisive move in [the] direction of liberal democracy itselfÓ:
ÒDemocracy and Democratization in Islam: The Quest for Islamic EnlightenmentÓ, U n i v e r s i t a s, 4
(1994), p. 246. 
the majorityÑsevenÑwere chosen by a complex and indirect process of selection
and that non-Muslims were allowed a place.1 4 To the extent that the electoral
principle had been introduced, it should also be remembered that this was still
on the corporate basis of the m i l l e t (community) system and not, as we have come
to expect, on the foundation of individual rights. 
The process of reform soon gathered steam from two directions. At the impe-
rial centre, the unsettling results of the recently concluded Crimean war encour-
aged officials to extend the earlier reforms. The Hatt of 1856 applied this incipi-
ent process of representation to the national level. Non-Muslim m i l l e ts were now
to allow for the greater participation of laymen, and their representatives were
to be included in the m e c l i s or national assembly whenever matters of concern to
all Ottoman subjects were being discussed. But also involved was the reconstitu-
tion of the m i l l e ts themselves, which were increasingly coming under criticism
from merchants and other bourgeois elements who felt excluded by the tradi-
tional Greek, Armenian, and Jewish elites. An assembly of indirectly elected del-
egates was created within each m i l l e t; the notable effect was to limit the author-
ity of their clergy in civil matters.1 5
With these as precedents, elections were first formally recognised in the
v i l a y e t (district) laws of 1864 and 1867. Indirect elections were held for district
administrative councils and general assemblies, and the pressure for greater rep-
resentative government steadily increased, partly as a result of liberal experi-
ments in such further reaches of the empire as the United Principalities, Egypt,
and Tunis. NamIk Kemal and the Young Ottomans insistently argued that the
experimentation had not gone far enough and that a national consultative
assembly (meclis-i üsura-yõ mmet) was required. With this as the larger picture, and
the poor handling of the Balkan revolts of 1875 the immediate context, 1876 wit-
nessed the deposition of two sultans and the promulgation of a constitution that
challenged the political status quo as no other prior event had done. It estab-
lished a chamber of deputies all of whose members were to be elected. Each
deputy would represent 50,000 male electors, and eachÑsignificantlyÑwould
represent all Ottomans, not merely his electoral district or sect.1 6 Power re-
mained, of course, mainly in the hands of the sultan, the » u l a m a were steadfast
7
1 4 . Roderic H. Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774Ð1923; The Impact of the West ( A u s t i n :
University of Texas Press, 1990), p. 100.
1 5 . On the millets and equality, see generally i b i d ., pp. 112Ð132.
1 6 . I b i d ., pp. 103Ð106. 
in their opposition, and the electoral process did not quite live up to its promise
but, rather, followed the v i l a y e t precedent of corporate representation. Yet, with
these developments, the notion of popular sovereignty began to penetrate the
Islamic political consciousness. Albert Hourani neatly summed up the contrary
impulses at work:
The elections took place under pressure from the local officials; not all the
deputies could speak Turkish, or knew how parliamentary debates should be
conducted; the Speaker had not changed his view that nothing should be done
which weakened the authority of the sovereign and the domination of the
Muslim element. In spite of all this, however, the debates were real: political
ideas were expressed, ministers and court officials were criticised and an
opposition group emerged.1 7
Pragmatic certification that evolution, perhaps imperceptibly at times, was
nonetheless occurring can be found in the fate of an electoral law passed by the
first chamber. Although Sultan Abdlhamid did not give assent to this law disal-
lowing religious preferment or discrimination, it did not disappear for good. It
came into effect in the young Turk period (1908Ð1918) and for all elections in the
Republic until 1939.1 8
The reaction to Hamidian authoritarianism that characterises the triumph of
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1908 marks the second explicit
turn to the language of freedom and rights in the late Ottoman period. It was to
prove no more lasting than the first in the mid-nineteenth century, and the
promise of constitutionalism was to be dashed by almost immediate civil strife.
But in 1911 the newly reconstituted parliament showed signs of vigour with the
emergence of competing political parties. The Entente Librale (Hrriyet ve I
.
t il øa f
F õ r k a s õ) , an amalgam of oppositional groups to the CUP, soon made its mark
when it won a by-election to parliament. The electoral collegeÕs selection of the
Liberal candidate was the Òfirst genuine electoral contest between two candi-
dates, each representing a different party and programmeÓ. Expectations were
immediately raised, but despite what appeared to be the advent of Òthe consti-
tutional millenniumÓ, the Òdemocratic redemptionÓ, in Bernard LewisÕs memo-
8
1 7 . Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798Ð1 9 3 9 (London: Oxford University Press,
1962), p. 105.
1 8 . Davison, Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, p. 107. 
rable phrase, was not to occur. Parliament was dissolved in January 1912, and
the ensuing staged election, appropriately called sopalõ secü i m (Òthe big-stick elec-
tionÓ), produced only six oppositional members out of 275 representatives.1 9
From mid-1913 until 1918, the empire would be ruled by a military clique, leav-
ing modern Turkey with the legacy of delicately interacting constitutional and
praetorian rule. 
The electoral principle became further entrenched in the Muslim world as a
result of turmoil elsewhereÑthe Constitutional Revolution in Iran. The unset-
tling events, internal and external, that combined to weaken the power of the
Qajar Shah from the late nineteenth century came to a head in the summer of
1906 when thousands took refuge in the grounds of the British Legation. Accord-
ing to contemporary reports, this b a s t became a ÒschoolÓ for the learning of pol-
itics and lawÑfor example, that ÒShahÓ should mean Òrepresentative of the
n a t i o n Ó .2 0 In truth, the picture was more complex as the » ulama divided between
proponents of major political reform and those loyal, after a fashion, to the
court. The momentum for a consultative assembly of some kind was unstop-
pable, however, though disagreement ensued as to whether this should be an
Islamic assembly, ostensibly based on the s h a r i»a, or a national ( m i l l i ) a s s e m b l y .
An imperial rescript on 6 August announced Òthe establishment of a Majles of
elected representativesÓ of various social classes, which would provide advice to
the ShahÕs ministers and would devise reforms to be Òenforced in accordance
with the s h a r i»aÓ .2 1
The task of devising an electoral law for the Majles fell to a motley crew of
religious officials, bureaucrats, merchants, and guildsmen who seemed intent
on advancing their own interests. The religious officials wanted to keep dissi-
dents from dominating the Majles, and the court wanted to maintain overall
control and to prevent an assembly dominated by the clergy.2 2 One contempo-
rary observer commented:
9
1 9 . Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961),
p p . 206Ð225, quotations at p. 217. Also see: Erik J. Zrcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B.
Tauris, rev. ed., 1998), pp. 107Ð108.
2 0 . Vanessa Martin, Islam and Modernism; The Iranian Revolution of 1906 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989),
p . 9 3 .
2 1 . Cited i b i d ., p. 98.
2 2 . Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906Ð1911; Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy,
and the Origins of Feminism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 65.
A number of totally uninformed people are busy writing the electoral rules in
the Military School. About two thousand meet there twice a week and ask for
their ÒrightsÓ. The government is trying to avoid implementing the rescript,
and there is likely to be a struggle between them and the people. The mem-
bers of the government suppose that they can deceive the people, and the peo-
ple think that they can achieve these wonderful results free of cost.2 3
An electoral law based on the Belgian constitution and supported by the mer-
chants and bureaucrats was finally adopted, and elections in Tehran occurred at
the end of September. Of the 200 members of the Majles, 60 were to be chosen
from Tehran and were divided into five categories: 32 represented the guilds, 10
the merchants, 10 the landowners including the a » y a n (notables), four the » u l a m a,
and four the Qajars. There were only a few hundred electors in each category, and
electors had to be literate males, Persian nationals, over 25, and substantial prop-
erty owners or engaged in a recognised trade or business. No mention was made
of religious affiliation, although heretics as well as women, minors, bankrupts,
and convicts were specifically excluded.2 4 The position of minorities such as
Zoroastrians, Armenians, and Jews was not specifically addressed, but some
feared that their natural demands for representation would alienate sections of
the » u l a m a. In the hope of avoiding this, the minorities were persuaded to allow
leading Shi»i religious and merchant figures to speak for them, thus securing rep-
resentation of a de facto, tentative kind. These events in Tehran were to produce
differing reactions in the provinces. Some members of the » u l a m a such as in Rasht
and Kermanshah feared diminution of their power and opposed the elections,
whereas others, such as in Najaf and to some extent Isfahan, saw the Majles as
strengthening Islam.
As the constitutional experiment unfolded, attitudes hardened, and the
debate centred on the somewhat artificial distinction between m a s h r u t a ( c o n s t i-
tutionalism) and m a s h r u»a (shari»a-minded rule).2 5 Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba¼i
(1841Ð1918) and Sayyid »Abdullah Bihbihani (d. 1910) provided lukewarm support
for the Majles, but Shaykh Fadlallah Nuri (1842Ð1909), who had encouraged lim-
1 0
2 3 . The words of Mukhbir al-Saltana cited in Martin, Islam and Modernism, p. 100.
2 4 . Mangol Bayat, IranÕs First Revolution: Shi»ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905Ð1909 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 146. Bayat puts the minimum age at 30 whereas Martin (I s l a m
and Modernism, p. 101) and Afary (The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, p. 64) list it as 25. The
electoral law was revised by electoral committees once voting had begun: Afary, p. 65. 
2 5 . Bayat, IranÕs First Revolution, pp. 161Ð183.
itations on the power of the Shah, grew for a number of reasons to oppose the
Majles and its principles of representative, elected government. To his mind, the
equality of all citizens was ÒimpossibleÓ in Islam, for it would be nonsensical to
put believers and non-believers, the rich and poor, husbands and wives, the
learned and ignorant on the same plane. Moreover, there was no need for a leg-
islative body because ÒIslam does not have any shortcomings that require com-
p l e t i o n Ó .2 6
S ch o o ls  o f  T ho u g ht
With the Tanzimat and Constitutional Revolution the electoral principle put
down early and strong roots, but, as the criticism of Fadlallah Nuri suggests, dif-
fering views quickly emerged. They have in fact crystallised into three modern
schools of thought.
The first happily accepts that elections are fully consistent with Islamic prin-
ciples. Building on Arab political thought that had emerged in the nineteenth
century, this view has expressed admiration for the electoral experience of
Europe and, to a lesser extent, America. Rifa»i al-Tahtawi (1801Ð73) referred
approvingly to dhawi al-intikhab, the elected officials, and Adib Ishaq sounded pos-
itively Lincolnesque when he spoke of hukumat al-sha»b biÕl-sha»b, Ògovernment of
the people by the peopleÓ.2 7 In the twentieth century, it is perhaps not surprising
that a Europhile like »Allal al-Fasi (1906Ð73) should find the competition of polit-
ical parties a desirable development, and the majority party the facilitating link-
age between parliament and executive.2 8
FasiÕs argument, like so many others, invokes the traditional notion of ahl al-
hall waÕl-»a q d, Òthose who loose and bindÓ. In medieval usage, it referred princi-
1 1
2 6 . Shaykh Fadlallah Nuri, ÒRefutation of the Idea of ConstitutionalismÓ, in John J. Donohue and
John L. Esposito (eds.), Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press,
1982), pp. 293Ð294, 296. Those who argue that Islam does not provide for equality of
individuals often base their argument on the Qur¼anic verse, ÒIs one who is a believer like one
who is godless? No, they are not equal (la yastawun)Ó (32:18). 
2 7 . See: Ami Ayalon, Language and Change in the Arab Middle East: The Evolution of Modern Political
D i s c o u r s e (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 55 and 105.
2 8 . See: Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1965), p. 161. 
pally to jurists who ÒelectedÓÑreally, selectedÑthe caliph. In modern usage, the
term has, perhaps inevitably, been broadened and democratised. Khayr al-Din al-
Tunisi (d. 1889) likened ahl al-hall to a parliament,2 9 and Muhammad Rashid Rida
(1865Ð1935)Ñcertainly not an admirer of late Ottoman and republican develop-
ments in TurkeyÑequated them with the members of the Grand National Assem-
bly. Unable to function except in a country free of imperial control, they could
not, in RidaÕs view, operate as the categorical Òguides and leadersÓ3 0 of the com-
munity in Egypt or India, but, even so, parliamentary bodies approximated the
modern embodiment of ahl al-hall. 
The comparison is revealing of the extent to which the representative idea
had gained currency by 1923 when Rida brought together various articles on the
subject from his widely influential periodical A l - M a n a r and published Al-khilafa aw
al-imama al-»uzma (The Caliphate or the Supreme Imamate). Indeed, earlier in this
journal he had noted the positive effect republicanism had induced in Europe.3 1
But in an allusion to the special qualities of the caliphal electors, he was aware
of an important difference with Western assemblies: Islam, unlike Europe,
demanded parliamentarians of high intellectual and moral quality. This implied
suspicion of the European experience should remind us that Rida was ultimate-
ly a proponent of the rule of the s h a r i»a3 2, not democratic governance as we know
it today, and the overall vision, not unlike that of later Islamist writers, was of an
integral whole in which the truly Islamic leader provided just and consultative
rule in close co-operation with an elite corps of religious and legal scholars. But
idealism of this kind was leavened with practical reason. However desirable the
caliphate based on ijtihad (independent judgement) was, an interim practical
arrangement must pave the way. The main institutions of Muslim learning, such
as Al-Azhar in Cairo or the Deobandi school in India, had fallen into irrelevance,
and political accommodations would have to be made among the Arabs and
between them and other Muslims.3 3 The religious authorities, however imper-
fect, have the opportunity, on the basis of active consultation, to forge a new con-
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2 9 . See: Wael Hallaq, ÒAhl al-hall waÕl »aqdÓ, in John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the
Modern Islamic World (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), vol. 1, p. 53.
3 0 . Muhammad Rashid Rida, Al-khilafa aw al-imama al-»uzma (Cairo: MatbaÔat al-Manar, 1341/1923),
p . 58. 
3 1 . A l - M a n a r [The Lighthouse], vol. 1 (1898), p. 869. 
3 2 . Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad »Abduh and Rashid Rida
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 55. 
3 3 . Rida, A l - k h i l a f a, pp. 58Ð64.
sensus (ijma») appropriate for the times.3 4 Moreover, although the s h a r i»a w o u l d
naturally be supreme, the caliph and ahl al-hall would need to supplement this
with enacted law ( q a n u n ).3 5 His acknowledgement that ahl al-hall had in effect
acquired contemporary identification with parliaments and that legislationÑ
ishtira» in his words3 6Ñ w a s a reasonable necessity was thus part of a candid recog-
nition that political reality had impinged upon the modern civic thought of Mus-
l i m s .
»Ali »Abd al-Raziq (1888Ð1966), in his controversial reinterpretation of Islamic
political thought that in significant ways took exception with RidaÕs interpreta-
tion, argued that Islam did not specify a particular form of political system; nor
did it require the caliphate. The Prophet was purely a spiritual leader, and Mus-
lims had long suffered under the tyranny of a government that was supposedly
ordained by either GodÕs law or the will of the community of believers ( u m m a ).
Despite what the great philosophers and the pious would say, both supposed
foundations, in his view, are mythical. It clearly cannot be said that »Abd al-Raziq
advanced a theory of democracy,3 7 but his was nonetheless a powerful critique of
Islamic history based in part on a voluntarist perspective. The caliphate was built
on brute force and the imposition of narrow will, rather than, as Rida had argued
it ought to be, on a considered contract (»a q d) between those who are endowed
with the power of choice and those chosen. Whereas the two writers disagreed
as to whether the ideal caliphate was possible or even Islamically ordained, they
revealed a shared, though rudimentary, sense of what kind of governance was
desirable. »Abd al-Raziq implied that government in our time should not follow
the example of »AliÕs and Mu»awiyaÕs accession, but should rather rest on the
foundation of willing allegiance (asas al-bay»a al-ikhtiyariyya). The dangers of inter-
nal lust for power and external manipulation are substantial. The ÒelectionÓ the
British organised to validate the rule of Faysal ibn Husayn in Iraq in 1921 may
have formally conformed to what was expected, for example, but ahl al-hall waÕl-
»a q d were constrained to choose and a real consensus was not reached.3 8
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The idea that government rests upon the consent and participation of the
people came into its own only from the mid-twentieth century onwards. The
title of the secular intellectual Khalid Muhammad KhalidÕs book is indicative of
this shift: Muwatinun, la raya» (Citizens, Not Subjects).3 9 At times a similar accept-
ance of republicanism among the religious establishment has seemed little
more than its characteristic acquiescence in entrenched power and the status
quo. The Egyptian mufti, Jad al-Haqq, responded for instance to the radical chal-
lenge of »Abd al-Salam FarajÕs manifesto, Al-farida al-ghayba (The Missing Precept),
by arguing that the particular form of government is dependent on current cir-
cumstance. The u m m a chooses its ruler (h a k i m) by whatever form of s h u r a ( c o n-
sultation) is prevalent at a given time. A m i r, caliph or president, the exact title
is a matter of historical contingency, not theological imperative.4 0 Others have
been more enthusiastic in endorsing consultative government as religiously
sanctioned. 
Muhammad Asad (1900Ð1992), European convert and peripatetic, may be
thought of as an unrepresentative and ultimately unassimilated Muslim intellec-
tual and, given his service to the Saudi and Pakistani states, to have contradicto-
rily offered an avid endorsement of democratic principles.4 1 But his thought pro-
vides a window on Islamic modernism, which powerfully emerged in his lifetime
and to which he contributed. He argued that it was misleading to apply a West-
ern term like democracy to Islam, especially since Muslims subordinate them-
selves to divine law. However, the Islamic state is not an end in itself: its goal is to
bring into being a community of people committed to maximising GodÕs word in
preventing injustice and establishing justice. The nearly forty injunctions in the
Qur¼an to Òobey God, the Prophet, and those in authority from among youÓ (e.g.,
4:59) are key to his conceptualisation. Obedience is a condition of government,
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but it is not unconditional and although the real source of sovereignty is the will
of God, the community is subject to the control of the people.4 2
The small phrase m i n k u m (among you) in the Qur¼anic phrase above is given
great weight and is thought to represent either the community as a whole or at
least those representing it. AsadÕs conclusion is unambiguous: Ò[I]t follows that,
in order to satisfy the requirements of Islamic law, the leadership of a state must
be of an elective nature; consequently, an assumption of governmental power
through non-elective means of any description becomes automatically, even
though the person or persons concerned be Muslims, as illegal as an imposition
of power by conquest from outside the Muslim communityÓ.4 3 It follows that the
majlis al-shura (consultative assembly) must be both representative of the entire
community, men and women, and the result of free and general election based
on universal suffrage. While the details of the electoral system were best left to
the particular community, it seemed only commonsensical to Asad that the main
institution of consultation in a Muslim society4 4 should itself be the product of
wide and direct consultationÑthat is, election.4 5
The principle of majoritarianism, which, as we shall see, has seemed prob-
lematic to many Muslims thinkers, is thought by Asad to be pragmatic and pre-
scribed by the traditions. To be sure, there is no guarantee that the majority will
do the right thing. Nor is there any certainty that a privileged minority will
always do the enlightened thing. Moreover, a Prophetic hadith (saying), derived
from Ibn Hanbal, can be summoned to the defence of the majoritarian principle:
ÒIt is your dutyÓ, it says, Òto stand by the community and a l -»a m m aÓÑw h a t A s a d
pointedly translates as Òthe majorityÓ. His conclusion would scarcely be out of
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parliamentary rule in the hope of rendering both parliaments more acceptable to Muslims and
Islam more appealing to the liberal-minded: Language and Change in the Arab Middle East,
p p . 1 2 0Ð1 2 2 .
4 5 . I b i d ., pp. 45Ð46.
place in Western liberal discourse: Òthe best we can hope for is that when an
assembly composed of reasonable persons discusses a problem, the majority of
them will finally agree upon a decision which in all probability will be right.Ó4 6
Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), head of the Shari»a Faculty at the University of
Qatar, is sometimes thought be a conservative, but on the issue of democracy he
takes a place along with the modernists such as Asad. His own experience of
Nasserist tyranny as a Muslim Brother in Egypt doubtless accounts for his strong
antipathy to authoritarian regimes and, perhaps, for the appeal to both practical
and sacred reason to sustain the defence of democracy. In his view, as authori-
tarian regimes have consistently acted against the interests of Islam, it seems
only reasonable that the Islamic movement should be in favour of democratic
institutions. It is true that many Islamists remain wary, and in the face of this
concern it must be affirmed that Islam is a unique political order and should not
be understood by comparison with others. Moreover, the distorting effects of sec-
ular democracies must be resisted, and the demands for Islamic law to replace
deleterious positive laws should be respected.4 7
But Muslims have to be realistic and understand that democracy comes closest
to incorporating the values that Islam advocatesÑconsultation, enjoining what is
good and prohibiting evil, resisting unbelief, among others. Parliament is virtually
a good in itself; it can only prevail in an environment of democracy and political
freedom. Ahl al-hall waÕl-»aqd remain important, but it is understood in our age that
they are chosen by Òway of electionÓ (tariq al-intikhab).48 Voting itself is a kind of cer-
tification of a candidateÕs bona fides for those who vote must themselves, like wit-
nesses in a legal case, be both just and reputable. If the individual Muslim neglects
the Òduty of votingÓ (wajibhu al-intikhabi) and thereby allows the unjust to come to
power, it is tantamount to abdication of the responsibility to serve witness to the
truth. By the same token, voting for candidates because of kinship or advantage,
rather than voting for the upright candidate, is similar to false testimony. 
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Anticipating, in part, the Qutbian argument that we shall see below, al-
Qaradawi acknowledges that the control of a fickle majority would be alarming.
But common sense, Islamic law, and ÒrealityÓ (a l - w a q i ») combine to dictate that
majority voting and decision-making are practical arrangements. Furthermore,
because we are talking about a M u s l i m society, the majority (a l - k a t h r a) can be
trusted not to pass legislation that would contradict the basic principles of the
faith. If necessary, a constitutional provision can be adopted that would nullify
any such offensive enactment. The notion that the people are entrusted with the
right to govern themselves is fundamental and does not derogate from GodÕs
ultimate sovereignty. As a complementary principle, the avoidance of tyranny
and the development of political freedom are imperative for the practice of the
faith and realisation of Muslim aspirations. A Òjurisprudence of balancesÓ (fiqh al-
m u w a z a n a t ), serving both the fundamental tenets of the faith and the interests of
Muslims, thus endorses democratic participation.4 9
A second line of argument stands in stark contrast with this view and is far
less sanguine. We have already encountered it with the views of Fadlallah Nuri.
In fact, it starts from the opposite end of the spectrum and rejects any notion of
popular sovereignty.5 0 Sayyid Qutb (1906Ð1966), the great theoretician of the
Muslim Brotherhood, presented a coherent view of man in his magnificent exe-
gesis of the Qur¼an. In a manner that might be unexpected, he allows for human
agency and his language is suffused with voluntarist and contractarian allusions,
for man is the viceregent of God on earth. But freedom and rights prevail only in
the context of submission to divine will. ManÕs volition (i r a d a) is at the core of his
being, but it must be used responsibly and not debased by selfish and animal
i n s t i n c t s .5 1 It is also the case that in our age tyrannical, secular politics have sig-
nificantly deprived individuals of the right to choose and have thwarted their
freedom of belief (hurriyyat al-»a q i d a) .5 2 One of the functions of j i h a d is to over-
throw despotism and to establish in its place a just order that enshrines the free-
dom of summons to the true path (hurriyyat al-da»w a) .5 3 Individual liberty is guar-
anteed, even for those not professing Islam, but all are subject to a basic covenant
(»a h d) with God. No one can try to impose their views and attempt to control via
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legislation (a l - t a s h r i »); authority is vested by the community only in those who
uphold the s h a r i»a.5 4 Commenting on the Qur¼anic verse that says, Òwere you to
follow the majority (a k t h a r) of those on earth, they will lead you away from the
path of GodÓ (6:116)5 5, he infers that this applies to those who would harmfully
provide changing norms for Muslim society.5 6 By implication, majoritarianism
and following popular opinion are rendered suspect. In his political manifesto,
M a»alim fiÕl-tariq (Signposts on the Road), Qutb makes it abundantly clear that
because the sovereignty of God is supreme, any form of popular sovereignty is a
fundamental deviation and all Óman-madeÓ law must be eliminated.5 7 It is clear
that, in this worldview, legislative assemblies and elections such as Asad envi-
sioned have decidedly no place. 
The contemporary Turkish writer Rasim zdenen has similarly argued that a
system based on popular sovereignty is incompatible with a theocentric order and
engenders a way of thinking that can only undermine the Islamic way of life.58 In
1982 in Egypt, Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha»rawi, a popular religious
leader, also created controversy by saying that Islam and democracy are incompat-
ible and that shura does not mean simple domination of the majority. A particular
manifestation of this argument is the denunciation of partyism (hizbiyya) as discor-
dant and tantamount to religiously proscribed fitna or disorder. Hasan al-Banna, the
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, saw the formation of distinct
political parties as a prime threat to Islamic unity; such divisiveness could only play
into the hands of IslamÕs enemies, especially the imperialists. All elements within
the umma must organise themselves into one powerfully unified bloc.59
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In Algeria, one of the younger leaders of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) and
a popular preacher, »Ali Belhadj (b. 1954), has justified his groupÕs electoral par-
t i cipation in the ill-fated elections of 1990Ð1991 by the longer-term effect of
advancing the cause. It was one way among others to affirm the role of Islam in
public life; participation was for Islamic, not democratic, reasons. It is clear that
he adheres to the line of thought that is critical of democracy as generally con-
ceived. He echoes the refrain that, derived from a Greek word and developed in
the Judeo-Christian context, it erroneously puts faith and impiety on the same
moral ground. Unrestricted liberty ends in anarchy and decadence. According to
Belhadj, democracy is also a flawed system because elections too often end as
those with the most money or might would like them to. In this sense, despite the
rhetoric of popular sovereignty and majoritarianism, only a minority governs in
reality. But even the supposed ideal is objectionable. Popular sovereignty leads to
the rule of scoundrels and is thus the antithesis of GodÕs authority. Moreover, con-
trary to Asad, the very concept of majority rule is objectionable since issues of
right and justice cannot be quantified; the greater number of votes does not trans-
late into the greater moral position. All the parliaments of the world cannot pre-
scribe what God forbids. It is thus only to be expected that democracy should be
replaced by inherently Islamic principles of governance, principally s h u r a.6 0
The writings of a young British-born Muslim, Tahir Mahmood (b. 1968), gives
a sense of how the views of the second school reach into situations where Mus-
lims live in a participatory democracy. He vehemently denounces notions of pop-
ular sovereignty as Òtantamount to the postulation of the inferiority or non-exis-
tence … of GodÓ. GodÕs sovereignty cannot be shared, and any Muslim states that
purport to be running ÒMuslim parliamentsÓ are merely misleading the believ-
ers. Certainly, such bodies cannot introduce the s h a r i»a, for divinely ordained law
cannot be legislated in a piecemeal fashion and is, at any rate, beyond human
m a n i p u l a t i o n .6 1 Islamic modernists, such as represented in the first school of
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thought above, have inflicted immense harm on the u m m a by aping the manners
and ideas of their colonial and post-colonial tutors. They have embraced democ-
racy, partly because they see it as a milieu in which they can prosper, and partly
because they have forgotten the superior spiritual vision of Islam.6 2 I n d e e d ,
democrats are fundamentally superficial and self-centred, and political parties
pretend to serve the public but care only about attaining power. They are anti-
individual and anti-liberty: Ò[T]hanks to the mass character of democracy, typified
in its concept of ÔmajoritarianismÕ that is concretely expressed via the electoral
system, the party system inevitably and naturally ignores the particular, the
unique and individual dimensions of each human beingÓ. The ballot box sadly
becomes an end itself; and the fundamental democratic motto, ÒThe Bottom Line
is Winning ElectionsÓ.6 3
There is a third line of argument that straddles the previous two: A form of
democracy is acceptable but not in its Western guise, and elections must partic-
ularly avoid the excesses and distortions found in Western parliamentary sys-
tems. The clearest proponent of this point of view was Abul A»la Mawdudi
(1903Ð1979), founder of the Jamaat-i Islami in South Asia and influential thinker
in the Middle East and elsewhere. To his mind, Islam promotes its own kind of
democracy, Ôtheo-democracyÕ, but his conception was not altogether consistent.
He said that each individual is GodÕs k h a l i f a (vicegerent) and the government is
constituted by Òthe general will of MuslimsÓ who have a right to depose it. More-
over, although ÒIslam does not regard the mere number of votes as a criterion of
truth and rectitudeÓ, he accepted that majority voting in an advisory body is a
practical necessity. But it is also clear that since the basis of legislative authori-
ty, s h u r a, is itself based on i j t i h a d, it must be limited to a select few who are well-
versed in religious subjects, Arabic, and now the modern sciences.6 4
MawdudiÕs view of elections is similarly ambivalent. On the one hand, even
though this did not apply to the Rightly Guided Caliphs (632Ð61), there is nothing
to prevent a legislative assembly from being elected. On the other hand, only Mus-
lims are entitled to vote in this situation. Moreover, majoritarianism is a suspect
principleÑeither in elections or in the operation of the assemblyÑbecause, in his
view, Islam does not regard the mere number of votes as a criterion of truth and
rectitude. What is more, elections themselves are a deeply flawed political method: 
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There is no room in Islam for candidature and electoral propaganda … E v e n
the very idea of three or four persons offering themselves as candidates for a
post and then duping the vote[r]s by issuing posters and placards, holding
public meetings, engaging in press propaganda, and adopting other methods
of this nature, is repugnant to the Islamic mentality. Islam detests the notion
that the voters should be fed and feasted and taken around in motor-cars and
that the candidate who beats others at the game of lying, cheating and squan-
dering money should win the game. These accursed methods are characteris-
tic of a Godless democracy. Under an Islamic government if the activities of a
person even smack of such a procedure he would, instead of being elected to
the council or caliphate, be prosecuted for doing so and punished.6 5
Such antipathy to the enthusiastic pursuit of public preferment would have met
with the approval of Sir Thomas More, who in his Utopia wrote with similar dis-
taste: Ò[A]nyone who deliberately tries to get himself elected to a public office is
permanently disqualified from holding oneÓ.6 6
A contemporary example suggests that the Mawdudi-like attempt to square
the circle has some appeal. Ali Bula üc, a Turkish intellectual who had previously
argued that Islam and democracy are incompatible, has come to advocate an
Islamic democracy that is predicated on what he refers to as a new Medina Com-
pact. Just as the seventh-century document laid out the contours of the original
Islamic state and its relations with indigenous non-Muslim communities, the
new agreement would bring together diverse communitiesÑMuslim and non-
MuslimÑin an overall political union whose shared guiding principles would be
agreed by autonomous Òsocial blocsÓ. Because legislation would be reserved for
each bloc or community, seemingly contradictory impulses would be reconciled:
the s h a r i»a would be upheld, as Muslims expect; and other communities would be
allowed to follow their lights in matters that were not agreed in common with
the Muslims.6 7
Alija Izetbegovic (b. 1925), president of Bosnia-Herzogovina and a writer on
Islamic matters with a wide readership, endorses what he refers to as a willing
acceptance of the Òbipolar principleÓ whereby the biological and spiritual, sci-
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ence and reason, are not seen as inevitably in conflict with each other. His quar-
rel is with the atheism and undue materialism of Western scientific theories and
political ideologies, including socialism on the one hand and democratic capital-
ism on the other. He approves of a Òthird wayÓ, which in the social realm is nei-
ther ÒforcedÓ nor exaggeratedly free.6 8 Islam rejects extremism of both kinds and
enshrines the ÒrepublicanÓ principle. By this, he means, rather ambiguously, that
the ÒnationÓ has the duty to participate in governing society and specifically
should choose the head of state, who must be responsible to the nation in return.
Such a seeming endorsement of the electoral principle is explicitly based on the
Qur¼anic injunction of consultation6 9ÑÒconsult them with regard to the conduct
of affairs, and once you have decided, put your trust in GodÓ (3:159)Ñas have
many other modern thinkers.7 0 Simultaneously, however, he reaffirms the
absolute sovereignty of God, and his translator, Ahmed Abidi, tells us that mass
political participation is central to the Western, but not the Islamic, idea of
democracy. Those who have the right to choose in an Islamic society must be
individuals of learning and good sense.7 1 This, presumably, is an effort to connect
the insistent demands of modern participation with the reassuring existence of
a traditional institution, though the broader definition of ahl al-hall waÕl-»a q d i s
itself reflective of how far the participatory impulse has taken hold. As with Maw-
dudi, then, the promotion of a specifically Islamic form of democracy, what he
suggests is Òmoderate democracyÓ,7 2 is an attempt to assert both difference andÑ
what is perhaps more important in the long runÑsimilarity. 
Although we are left, perhaps inevitably, with several contrasting and coex-
isting views, the larger pictures suggests, if not a shift in action towards the plu-
ralist and participatory end of the spectrum, the infiltration into the hegemonic
discourse of the vocabulary of participation. Indeed, a dialogue between Saudi
»ulama and European scholars in 1974, widely distributed by the Saudis even
today, startlingly proclaims that the Islamic state derives its power from the peo-
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ple (sultatuha min al-sha»b). In this regard, the Islamic state, while naturally guid-
ed by the principles of faith, is thought to be similar to Òconstitutional demo-
cratic statesÓ predicated on popular sovereignty.7 3 The overall thrust of the polit-
ical philosophy propounded therein is, of course, against a democratic, partici-
patory system and the immediate point being made is that the » u l a m a do not con-
stitute a privileged, clerical class in Islam. Furthermore, it must be recognised
that the target audience of this discussion was external to the kingdom and the
intention was doubtless to improve its public image. If this was nothing other
than an attempt by the Saudis to legitimise themselves, however, the apparent
sensitivity to an emergent international norm of constitutional and participato-
ry government is nonetheless revealing.
L e a r n i ng  Pro c e s s
Standard views of elections argue that they have three effects: They legitimise the
regimes that allow them; provide for the recruitment and circulation of political
elites; and influence policy making.7 4 To this we may tentatively add a fourth:
they initiate a learning process whereby participatory experience exercises a kind
of socialising, feedback effect. 
I r a n
The experience of Iran and elsewhere in the Muslim world testifies to the
changes that are under way. Iran has had to date six Majles elections and seven
presidential elections (with five presidents chosen). The Iranian Constitution
affirms that the people should participate Òin determining their political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural destinyÓ (Principle 3), and provides for a popularly
2 3
7 3 . Nadwat »ilmiyya hawla al-shari»a al-islamiyya wa huquq al-insan fiÕl-islam (Colloquia on Islamic Law
and Human Rights in Islam) (Jidda: Dar al-Bilad liÕl-Tib»a waÕl-Nashr, n.d.), p. 26 of session on
ÒHuquq al-insan wa wahdat al-usra al-bashariyyaÓ (Human Rights and the Unity of Mankind in
Islam) at Strasbourg, 2Ð4 November 1974.
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elected national assembly (Principle 62) and for periodic referenda on issues that
are submitted Òdirectly to the people for a judgementÓ (Principle 59). Of course,
the residual power of the Council of Guardians to vet and deselect candidates is,
without doubt, a powerful reminder that elections are not convincingly open and
free. In early 2000, for example, it disallowed more than 775 names for the Majles
e l e c t i o n s .7 5
For the most part, however, recent experiences have been encouraging. The
Presidential election of 1997 was clearly a watershed. Graffiti had appeared on
Tehran walls during the campaign cynically predicting, Òwe vote, you electÓ. But,
faced with more than an 80 percent turnout and 69 percent of the vote going to
Muhammad Khatami (b. 1943), the regime could not do anything other than
acquiesce, even if unhappily so. Drawing together a formidable coalition of the
young, professionals, the liberal intelligentsia and especially women, Khatami
gained in his electoral landslide the incalculable advantage of legitimacy for
measured change. Khatami has not always been able to prevail, as he did at the
outset when he removed the head of the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) who
had said he would not allow the election to stand. Indeed, subsequent events
such as his timid handling of student riots, the jailing of his former Minister of
the Interior, and the invalidated election of several of his supporters indicate
how he has been embattled. It is often said in Iran that Khatami is the only pres-
ident in the world who is also the leader of the opposition.
But, stepping back a bit, we might say that the election demonstrated the
maturity of a system in which a serious challenger to the status quo could be
popularly chosen a n d remain in office. Some even profess to see in this, and the
explosion of publications popularising ideas of liberalism and civil society, the
beginning of the move to a Òpost-IslamistÓ or post-fundamentalist state.7 6
Whether one goes as far as this or not, it is clear that the proliferation of jour-
nalsÑmore than a thousand in the estimate of Farhad Khosrokhavar7 7Ñhas had
an impact on politicising the public. 
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In the municipal elections of February 1999, the first in IranÕs long history,
Khatami-type reformers were the big winnersÑ80 percent. The turnout, particu-
larly in Tehran, was lacklustreÑonly 1.4 million out of 4 million eligible voters in
the capitalÑbut there was relatively greater enthusiasm in the less jaded small
towns and villages. Women won 300 out of the 197,000 seats, and had fielded
5,000 candidates out of the total of 300,000. But this, overall, was a significant
step forward. The tendency of women to vote along gender lines concentrated
the impact of their vote. In Saveh, for example, a farming town south of Tehran,
women took a majority of seats on the council.7 8
In the Majles elections of February/April 2000, another large turnoutÑ80 per-
cent of the 38 million eligible votersÑindicated the widespread sense both that
something important was at stake and, implicitly, that voting mattered. ÒMany
voters, even those in districts that are traditionally conservative, said they were
casting ballots for the first time since the 1979 revolution because they felt, for
once, that their vote countedÓ.7 9 The pro-Khatami forces gained the majority of
seats, initially taking 29 of the 30 seats in Tehran for example and winning over-
all nearly two-thirds of the Majles.8 0 ÒConservativesÓ fared badly, even in Qum
and the bazaar in Tehran. But manipulation from above was certainly not absent.
»Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (b. 1935), the former Speaker of the Majles and
President, secured the last seat in Tehran with a humiliating 25.587 percent of
the vote (the law requires a candidate to win at least 25 percent of the vote in
order to be elected in the first round).8 1
The electoral campaign was noteworthy for the way in which candidates of all
persuasions embraced the give-and-take tactics of the contested election. The
reformists Òfashioned a cutting-edge of campaigning, complete with pep rallies
and press briefings, as well as an appeal to the issues that resonate with the Iran-
ian public … rather than a restatement of stale revolutionary orthodoxyÓ. Raf-
sanjani sent flyers to more than 2 million homes in Tehran that depicted him
without his clerical turban and sitting in a garden with a little boy. Despite the
elliptical language, his slogan reflected the kind of campaign promise familiar in
all electoral contests: ÒI will stay with you in winter and deliver you to the
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springÓ. Muhammad Reza Bahonar, a member of the conservative Disciples of the
Line of the Imam who eventually lost his seat, said that his colleagues had no dif-
ficulty in using the word ÒfreedomÓ in their slogans. The revolution had been
fought for in the name of liberty, and Ò[a]fter all, God created people as free
b e i n g s Ó .8 2
The use of such language may well be more than simply stylistic. Although,
on the one hand, Khatami conceded that the authentication of the Supreme
Leader of the revolution was necessary to transform electoral results into a
national and religious obligation, a number of ostensibly conservative organisa-
tions have, on the other hand, seemed to internalise liberal ideas. The Universi-
ty Islamic Associations (Anjomanha-ye Eslami-ye Daneshgahha), while purport-
edly intended to Islamise the universities, have supported the Muslim reformist
thinker Abdul Karim Soroush. The Association of Militant Clergy (Majma»-e
Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez), despite its name, was a long time defender of liberal
ideas, but grew more committed to these from 1989. It and its student allies were
especially impelled to defend democratic values when the government closed
down its newspaper S a l a m in July 1999.8 3 Further evidence that a discursive shift
has occurred may be found in the vigorousÑthough by no means unchallengedÑ
debates in the press and intellectual journals over the meaning of velayat-e faqih
(guardianship of the jurist), the central concept of Islamic authority in revolu-
tionary Iran. Some have professed to see in it the makings of popular rule, and
there is no doubt that individuals such as Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar have
offered a view which is at variance with the conservative clergy but which
nonetheless argues that the revolution, especially the Islamic revolution, was
made by and for the people.
Hizbullah in Lebanon
In the Arab world, the transformations in Shi»i Hizbullah in Lebanon have often
been remarked upon. The ÒParty of GodÓ was, since its inception in 1982, unwa-
vering in its opposition to the Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon and
associated with hostage-taking of Western and other individuals. It has thus
acquired in the West the image of a militant, ideologically-driven and Iranian-
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supported organisation. But its spiritual guide, Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah
( b . 1935), has also questioned the application of velayat-i faqih to multi-sectarian
Lebanon and spoken of Islam as a ÒcivicÓ (m a d a n i) religion that must be realistic
above all.8 4 Hizbullah fielded candidates in the first elections since the Lebanese
civil war in 1992 and secured eight parliamentary seats of the 27 apportioned to
the Shi»a (out of a total of 128 members); in 1996 it won seven seats.8 5 In the local
elections of June 1998, Hizbullah did not fare particularly well, owing largely to
splits within the movement and conflict with its Shi»i competitor, AMAL (Afwaj al-
Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya, the Lebanese Resistance Brigades). Whereas it made a
strong showing in the southern suburbs of Beirut, it won only five of the 21 seats
in another Shi»i heartland, the Biqa» valley. In the 2000 elections, Hizbullah was
expected to benefit from what was widely perceived as its triumph over the
Israelis, who withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000 after a 22-year occu-
pation. The Syrians, wary of an enhanced Hizbullah and fearful of an uncontrolled
spillover from intra-Shi»i conflict, brokered an electoral alliance with AMAL. In the
complicated voting that ensued, Hizbullah itself won seats in the south of the
country and the eastern Biqa», taking 12 out of 128 total parliamentary.8 6
HizbullahÕs participation in the electoral process can be explained by external
and internal factors. The post-Khumaynist leadership in Iran both decreased
financial support to the movement and encouraged it to work within the con-
straints of the Lebanese system. In addition, factionalism within the movement
led to the isolation of influential figures, such as Subhi al-Tufayli, who regarded
elections as a diversion from resistance to Israel and assistance to the poor. More-
over, as with other Islamist groups, many in Hizbullah regarded elections as a
valuable entry point to the national political arena and a means to influence pol-
icy. Its secretary general, Hasan Nasrallah, justified participation in the 1992 elec-
tions by saying, ÒWe have now decided to join the elections because we feel we
need to fortify [opposition to confessionalism] in all positions and we must work
to serve our people wherever they areÓ.8 7
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Once in parliament, Hizbullah has remained faithful to its larger agenda of
opposition to Israel and American policy in the region, deconfessionalisation,
and a reconstruction of Lebanon that would benefit the less fortunate, especial-
ly the Shi»a, and not just the elites. But it has also shown itself to be comfortable
with the tactical shifts and accommodations that are necessary for its members
to emerge as successful parliamentarians. As we have seen, despite a long-stand-
ing and often violent rivalry with AMAL, it has electorally allied with it as nec-
essary. For example, a meeting between Nasrallah and Nabih Birri, the AMAL
leader, in Damascus and under Syrian pressure, resulted in a last-minute
alliance during the 1996 elections.8 8 Hizbullah has also made complex pre-elec-
toral bargains with many of the large, landed families whom it has severely crit-
icised. Furthermore, it channelled its opposition to the first Hariri premiership
(1992Ð1998) through parliamentary votes against his budget, economic pro-
grammes, and foreign policy. It also carefully avoided provoking the Syrians and
kept within their tacit limits of acceptable policyÑthe ÒSyrian skyÓ (al-saqf al-
s u r i). The explanation for such bargaining and pragmatism lies in significant
part in its minority position, controlling less than 10 percent of the seats in par-
liament. Augustus Richard NortonÕs fieldwork is illuminating: ÒLebanese parlia-
mentarians, including senior Maronites, a former Sunni prime minister and
highly respected Armenian deputies have noted in private interviews (in 1995
and 1996) that the Hizbullah deputies have behaved responsibly and coopera-
tively. They have often built political alliances in the parliament on pragmatic
grounds …Ó8 9
The question remains as to whether, in addition to these structural factors,
an underlying shift in attitudes has occurred. There is no doubt that resistance,
martyrdom, battle, and sacrifice formed an indispensable part of NasrallahÕs
language when talking about the Israeli occupation of Lebanon.9 0 Once regard-
ed as a hard-liner and now a supporter of parliamentary politics, he also clearly
advocates an Islamic state in which Muslims would dominate, the s h a r i»a w o u l d
prevail, no distinction between religion and politics would exist, and the posi-
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tion of minorities would be resolved later. It is also the case that he and other
leaders have invoked democratic elections as a standard by which to score
points, making unfavourable judgement about opponents and drawing the obvi-
ous, approving comparison with Hizbullah. The Saudi regime, for example, is
scarcely representative or pluralist in his view; nor is Egypt where the Islamists
cannot openly operate. The United States also talks a good democratic game, but
it thwarts the self-determination of people with whom it disagrees around the
w o r l d .9 1
The groupÕs Majlis al-Shura has issued fatawa (religious legal opinions) call-
ing on its members to vote for Hizbullah candidates. This could be dismissed as
mere instrumentalism, but the religiously charged formulation, puts voting on
another plane: ÒEvery man will be asked about his vote on judgement dayÑany
adherent to the supreme Islamic interest should hold the list high and drop it
as is in the voting boxÑand it is illicit to elect anybody else who is not on the
l i s t Ó .9 2 Participatory language is also increasingly part of HizbullahÕs discourse.
The Islamic state that is envisioned for Lebanon must respect the will of the
people and not be imposed by force.9 3 Its 1996 electoral programme referred to
the ÒhonorÓ that the people had bestowed on Hizbullah by putting them in par-
liament in 1992, and although it spoke of the need for an overall framework of
morality, it reaffirmed its support for freedom of belief, the press, and political
a c t i v i t y .9 4 HizbullahÕs recognition of the need to work within Lebanese reali-
tiesÑwhat has been called LebanonisationÑis a reminder of how difficult it is to
read the situation. On one level, this accommodation can be seen as short-term
and tactical only, allowing the movement the freedom to prepare for the impo-
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sition of an intolerant order later. Yet, on another level, it can be interpreted as
a substantial concession to pluralism, which in the long run would amount a
virtual acceptance of the principle.9 5
J o r d a n
The Jordanian experience more clearly indicates a gradual development of com-
mitment, by both government and opposition, to the electoral process. In the elec-
tions of 1989 to parliament (Majlis al-Nuwwab), the first free elections in the coun-
tryÕs history, the total Islamist bloc attained 32 out of 80 seats, with the Islamic
Action Front (IAF), the Muslim Brotherhood political party in Jordan, winning 22.5
percent of the seats (22) and 15.6 percent of the overall vote.9 6 The number of IAF
parliamentarians declined in the election of 1993, falling from 22 to 16, but its
overall electoral strength slightly increased (16 percent of the overall vote). In addi-
tion to the IAF deputies, six independent Islamists were elected.9 7 The explanation
for the decline in Islamist seats has to do with a change in the electoral system. In
the elections of 1997, which the IAF officially boycottted, the total Islamist result
was seven seats (of which two were informally associated with the IAF).9 8
Despite the vicissitudes of the Islamist vote, these elections formed part of an
intricate pattern of increasing political openness in Jordan. The 1989 election was
indisputably the result of the regimeÕs limited capacity to repress opposition,
adverse economic difficulties, changing relations in the Palestinian-Israeli con-
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flict, and the calculations of King Hussein that popular participation would pro-
vide a new legitimacy formula for his rule both within and outside the king-
d o m .9 9 But whatever structural vulnerabilities existed and however instrumental
its origins were, the electoral process, once set in motion, acquired its own
dynamic. Malik Mufti convincingly argues, for example, that after the political
elite had made the decision to allow elections, the decision not to enforce a pro-
vision that would have required party affiliated candidature became defensible
and was implemented. The National Charter of June 1991, which proclaimed that
Jordan was based on Òparliamentary and hereditary monarchyÓ, naturally fol-
lowed the instability caused by the Gulf crisis and war of 1990Ð1991 and the
growing recognition of regime and opposition that their common interest lay in
formalising the liberalising process.1 0 0
This Òinternal logicÓ101 of participation and liberalisation applied to the
Islamists. Although some clearly feared that participation would leave them open
to both governmental manipulation and internal charges of having sold out, the
Brotherhood overcame its original hesitation and largely endorsed the idea.
According to Ishaq Farhan, the secretary-general of the IAF, after 1989 Òthe major-
ity tendency, more than two-thirdsÓ became committed to Òreform not through
violence but gradually and by convincing people. Evolution not revolution.Ó
Although he faced an internal revolt in the run-up to the 1993 elections and the
dissenters remain an active force, the dominant attitude has been to regard elec-
tions as an indispensable ingredient of democracy and to accept setbacks as a nor-
mal feature of participatory politics from which valuable lessons can be gleaned.102
The tribal component of Jordanian elections also needs to be entered into our
analysis. Linda Layne has documented the extent to which tribal identity played
a role in the earlier 1984 election. Contrary to what the state would have cared
to acknowledge, tribal leaders played a disproportionately strong role in candi-
dature, and tribal affiliation often affected voting preferences. But, significantly,
tribal identity was not all determining, and shifting notions of tribesman and cit-
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izen emerged. Voting and citizenship were not abstract, disembodied political
acts, unrelated to the cultural context. Yet tacit resistance to tribal influence and
expressions of individual will also occurred: ÒThe »a r a b [tribal] value of personal
autonomy and the ideology of democratic elections complemented and rein-
forced each otherÓ.1 0 3
The case of Jordan demonstrates the combined force of structural/utilitarian
and normative considerations in the reinforcement of electoral politics. Such a
commitment does not mean the process of democratisation is irreversible or
even substantially entrenched; nor does it mean that citizens, including
Islamists, will remain predominantly favourable towards elections or be unaf-
fected by tribal and family considerations. Indeed, surveys indicated that respon-
dents believed the country was less democratic in 1996 than in 1993, and that
confidence in political parties and electoral procedures was relatively low.1 0 4
Nevertheless, the restructuring of the
political system as well as self-interest prompted a deliberate Islamist choice
to participate in elections, and this in turn has encouraged acceptance by many,
though certainly by no means all, Islamists of the electoral principle. As with the
Association of Militant Clergy in Iran, the calculated defence of a democratic
norm is not necessarily unrelated to the advancement over time of a more open
public order. 
E g y p t
The situation in Egypt has been more complex. In distinct contrast to the one-
party convention of the Nasserist era, Article 5 of the present constitution guar-
antees multi-party participation (t a»addud al-ahzab), but the ruling National
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Democratic Party (NDP) has consistently maintained a clear hold on power. While
the Muslim Brotherhood has never been legalised as a political party, it partici-
pated in coalitions with other parties in 1984 and 1987, taking eight and 35 seats
respectively. The 1987 election in particular reduced the NDPÕs overall strength
to 78 percent of the PeopleÕs Assembly (Majlis al-Sha»b ) ,1 0 5 and some observers
have referred to this period as EgyptÕs modern liberal phase. Most of the major
opposition parties formally boycotted the election of 1990 because a revised elec-
toral law failed to guarantee independent supervision. Although a number of
Muslim Brothers and other Islamists stood as independents, the oppositional
share of seats was substantially reduced. The 1995 election was especially trou-
bled. Nearly 4,000 candidatesÑroughly ten per seatÑentered the contest, but the
NDP ended with 94 percent of the seats.1 0 6 There was a particular crackdown on
the Muslim Brotherhood, and while 148 members entered the race, only one was
elected. The 2000 elections were regarded as fairer than those in the recent past,
mainly owing to a court decision that required judges to oversee voting at polling
stations. However, violence and intimidation occurred, especially directed
against oppositional candidates in general and Muslim Brotherhood candidates
in particular. The final result gave the NDP a substantial but reduced majority,
and 17 of the 444 contested seats went to the Brotherhood, which made it the
largest oppositional bloc.1 0 7
Given regime manipulation of the electoral process, the unfolding of a learn-
ing process must seem problematic. To the extent that the government appears
undemocratic, Islamist candidates are in the expected position of distinguishing
themselves by defending democratic virtues. However, the Ikhwan has also
linked the tactical with the ideological and connected short-term considerations
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with the long-term. Elections are a form of public education for they expose the
people to why the Brotherhood regards Islam as Òthe solutionÓ, and they simul-
taneously provide members with the invaluable experience of advocacy. If they
are successful in securing parliamentary seats, they are able to push the country
towards full implementation of the s h a r i»a. If they are unsuccessful, then at least
they have disseminated noble ideas and honed their communications skills.1 0 8
The Brotherhood is the heir of the several intellectual trends discussed above,
and there is no doubt that the majority subscribe to either the first or third
schools of thought, thereby accepting the Islamic validity of elections though not
necessarily their Western form. The experience of electoral participation, che-
quered and disappointing, has provided damning evidence for those opposed to
accommodating the regime. Yet, for others, precisely because electioneering
appears to make long-term sense, the participatory and pluralist values that lie
behind it may be further internalised. »Ali »Abd al-Fattah of the Brotherhood saw
the fielding of a female Brotherhood candidate in the 2000 elections as unexcep-
tional: ÒIslam does not prejudice men against women, and our nomination of a
woman to run in the election is a practical application of the fact that women are
half of the societyÓ.1 0 9
Palestinian HAMAS
A case apart from other Sunni Arab movements is the Palestinian HAMAS, which
does not operate within an accepted state framework. Committed to a strongly
anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist ideology since its inception in late 1987, it has also
vigorously opposed the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) both as a com-
petitor for leadership of the Palestinian movement and for its promise of a secu-
lar future. HAMASÕs covenant offers a radically different programme based on
the inalienability of any part of Palestine because of its sanctified status as an
Islamic endowment (w a q f). Moreover, it elevates j i h a d against IslamÕs enemies to
the status of an individual obligation (fard »a y n), thereby intensifying the level of
commitment. The c o v e n a n t is silent on issues of internal governance other than
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to suggest vaguely, as would be expected, that the Qur¼an is the constitution and
Islam constitutes the societyÕs programme of life (minhaj hayat) .1 1 0
HAMASÕs attitude towards elections has been ambivalent. Its suspicion of
them may be explained in part by wariness of Israeli manipulation. For example,
when Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in April 1989 suggested holding elections
in the occupied territories as a way of lowering Intifada tensions, HAMAS detect-
ed a plot and rejected any notion of Israeli disinterested good will. Interestingly,
however, the rejection was not categorical: ÒLet our slogan be ÔNo!Õ to the initia-
tives of Rabin and Shamir and ÔNo!Õ to elections until the occupation is ban-
i s h e d Ó .1 1 1
A more positive attitude is clearly seen in HAMASÕs participation in student
and professional association elections. It has been particularly successful in con-
trolling the Islamic University in Gaza, but has fared less well at the more secu-
lar Birzeit University. Even there, however, it joined an anti-PLO coalition that
won 52 percent of the vote and all nine seats in November 1993, just after the
PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principles was signed. In 1996Ð1997, it won 46.7 per-
cent of the student council vote at Al-Najah University in Nablus, which has had
PLO sympathies, and in 1997Ð1998 it won 49.5 percent of the vote. Although it
won only 30 percent of the medical union elections in 1997, it won the engi-
neering union election in Gaza in 1998.1 1 2 These elections helped HAMAS both to
put down deeper roots into Palestinian society and, precisely because they
revealed a level of popular support, to strengthen its hand against the PLO. More-
over, it was HAMAS that suggested after December 1992 that its price for joining
the PLO as a sign of national unity was elections, inside the occupied territories
and overseas, to its decision making bodies.1 1 3 This proposal must be read against
the intense intra-Palestinian rivalry, and HAMAS naturally understood that its
acceptance was a price the PLO was unwilling to pay. But, as with the university
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and professional elections, it may have been revealing of a certain ÒfaithÓ in elec-
t i o n s1 1 4Ñat least in the sense that they were thought to be useful. 
The election to the Legislative Council of January 1996 posed a considerable
dilemma, however. If, on the one hand, HAMAS were to participate, it would
appear to endorse the peace process, specifically the Camp David, Madrid, and
Oslo agreements that had called for elections, and to enhance the legitimacy of
its main rival, the PLO. Yet, on the other hand, if it were to boycott the elections,
it might be left behind in the building of the Palestinian state and appear self-
centredly preoccupied with its own ideological purity. The views of Shaykh
Ahmad Yasin (b. 1937), the spiritual leader of HAMAS, evolved over time. In late
1993, legislative elections seemed as valid a way to express opposition as street
protests, and f a t a w a opposing electoral participation were, to his mind, counter-
productive and un-Islamic for they denied Muslims the right to serve the u m m a
in the effective capacity of parliamentary deputy.1 1 5 By early 1995, however, his
opposition to the proposed form of elections emerged. He made it clear that par-
ticipation in these elections would only lead to the establishment of a puppet
government doing IsraelÕs bidding.1 1 6 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela present a
remarkable internal document that, although written in 1992, is revealing of the
wider and long-standing debates over the advisability of electoral participation.
These debates were notable for their express utilitarianism and the absence of
Islamic terminology. Repeated references were made to protecting the position
of the movement while preserving the goal of resistance, and to this end partic-
ipants realistically assessed HAMASÕs limited popular appeal and candidly con-
ceded a fear that events would overtake them.1 1 7
Worried that Yasir »Arafat would use an Islamic political party to blunt its
appeal, and despite Shaykh YasinÕs earlier opposition to the formation of its own
political party,1 1 8 HAMAS reluctantly endorsed Khalas (Hizb al-Khalas al-Watani
3 6
1 1 4 . Hurub, Hamas: Al-fikr waÕl-mumarasa al-siyasiyya, p. 239.
1 1 5 . I b i d ., p. 246. 
1 1 6 . ÒAl-Shaykh al-Mujahid Ahmad Yasin yatahadath li-filastin al-muslimaÓ (The Combatant Shaykh
Ahmad Yasin Talks with Filastin al-Muslima), Al-filastin al-muslima, March 1995/Shawwal 1410
A.H., p. 26.
1 1 7 . Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 121Ð131. See also the pragmatic views of IsmaÕil Haniyah,
who argued in favour of electoral participation, in: Hurub, Hamas: Al-Fikr waÕl-Mumarasa al-
Siyasiyya, p. 250.
1 1 8 . Mideast Mirror, 6 June 1995; A l - H a y a t, 9 June 1995; ÒAl-Shaykh al-Mujahid Ahmad Yasin
Yatahadath li-Filastin al-MuslimaÓ, p. 25.
al-Islami, Islamic National Salvation Party), which was formed in November 1995.
The majority of the HAMAS leadership hoped that through support of this party
it could maintain its position in the internal political arena without giving the
impression that it had also implicitly accepted the Oslo peace process; it sought
to preserve both its options and its distance. In the end, neither HAMAS nor Kha-
las contested the election directly, but HAMAS made known its support for seven
independent, sympathetic candidates. Five of these candidates were elected (out
of a total Council membership of 88), and an exit poll showed that 60Ð70 percent
of HAMAS supporters took part in the voting. In effect, then, it had chosen Òunof-
ficial participationÓ in the election.1 1 9
HAMAS leaders have not opposed participation in future municipal elections
in which the movement may be expected to do well,1 2 0 and their main attitude,
despite clear disagreements over tactics, has consistently been to avoid endow-
ing legitimacy on the Palestinian Authority. It has not objected to the electoral
principle, and, notwithstanding its determined opposition to Israel, it has in fact
specifically endorsed concepts of pluralism, democracy, and minority rights in
the internal governance of the Palestinians. Shaykh Yasin famously said in a 1989
interview with the Jerusalem newspaper A l - N a h a r that HAMASÕs commitment to
democracy is so great that it would honour electoral results which either brought
the Communist Party to power or confirmed the popular rejection of an Islamic
state. Moreover, elections are intrinsically valid: ÒThere is no other way to choose
representatives of the people (m i n yimthal al-sha»b) except the way of electionsÓ. A
1991 manifesto expressed opposition to forced conformity of opinion and specif-
ically argued that no one could claim to represent the Òmasses of our peopleÓ
(jamahir sha»b i n a) without Òfree, honest, and neutral electionsÓ (intikhibat hurra wa
naziha wa muhayada) .1 2 1 Ibrahim Ghawsha, the movementÕs spokesperson in
Amman, went so far as to say that it does not matter whether the ruling party is
nationalist or Islamist; what matters is that it is elected freely and fairly.1 2 2 T h e s e
views are broadly consistent with those of the Muslim Brotherhood, of which
HAMAS claims to be the branch in the West Bank and Gaza.1 2 3
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HAMASÕs attitudes have clearly been shaped by its circumstances, particular-
ly opposition to the Israeli occupation and competition for political advantage
with the PLO. Internal divisions within the movement itself have also played a
role. For example, despite GhawshaÕs general statement above, he was opposed
to the January 1996 election and thus often found himself at odds with influen-
tial individuals inside the occupied territories. Mahmud al-Zahar in Gaza, for
example, argued that an Islamic movement must adapt to realities, including
self-rule elections, and not appear to reject democracy.1 2 4 But in this instance and
elsewhere, the objection was to a particular election, not to the general concept
itself. The instrumentalist nature of HAMASÕs views may well lead to questions
about the depth of its democratic commitment. But because elections in the fac-
tionalised context of Palestine are an indisputably effective means to what all
political movements seekÑpowerÑthey may begin to put down roots in HAMASÕs
normative territory, or become an integral part of its political strategy. Indeed,
HAMASÕs experience in university and syndicate elections, in which it has suf-
fered wins and losses but continues to take part, may be generating over time a
kind of learning process that helps to ratify an incipient normative commitment.
There is no doubt, however, that its electoral history is too new and the configu-
ration of the Palestinian state still too unsure to warrant definitive pronounce-
ments. 
Q a t a r
In the small and conservative emirate of Qatar, a notable experiment in political
participation occurred in February 1999. Initiated from the top and seemingly
unrelated to economic or legitimacy crises, relatively open elections were held
for the first time in the Arab Gulf, with women both allowed to vote and to stand
for office. Of the 22,225 registered votersÑof the roughly 70,000 Qataris eligible
to registerÑ45 percent were women. The turnout in the election for the Central
Municipal Council was 95 percent in the capital and main population centre, and
75 percent in the rest of the country.1 2 5 Three percent of the 227 candidates were
women, but none was among the 29 elected.
3 8
1 2 4 . Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, pp. 164Ð166. Al-Zahar was the official HAMAS
spokesperson within the occupied territories from 1994 to 1996. 
1 2 5 . Louay Bahry, ÓElections in Qatar: A Window of Democracy Opens in the GulfÓ, Middle East
P o l i c y, 6, no. 4 (June 1999), p. 123.
Clearly, the results of the election were not all that many, especially women,
had hoped for. Amira Muzza in particular, who has been active in promoting new
attitudes towards women, was not thought to be pleased. One defeated candidate
blamed a traditional, patrimonial society in which women acquiesced in their
husbandÕs political wishes. As an indicator of entrenched attitudes, 18 members
of the » u l a m a Ñtaking a position affirmed by Mawdudi and others1 2 6Ñ p e t i t i o n e d
the a m i r not to allow women to sit in the Council and thus have leadership over
m e n .1 2 7 In addition, voting often occurred on the basis of tribal ties and person-
al loyalties. Four candidates were chosen from the Al-Murra tribe alone, and
some individuals voted in the first place as an act of allegiance to the a m i r.1 2 8
Noticeably absent were well-defined political and ideological platforms or group-
ings. The example of Kuwait, where distinct political groupings have emerged
but where the ruling house has nevertheless often encouraged tribal voting as a
way of insuring a compliant national assembly,1 2 9 suggests that the Qatari
regime will not have difficulties in manipulating future elections. Finally,
although the turnout figures indicated a high level of interest among registered
voters, the low registration rate should be remembered; overall, less than 30 per-
cent of those of voting age in the country actually voted.1 3 0
The problems are thus formidable and the experiment is too young to suggest
a reinforcing effect. But there is no doubt that the election forms part of an often
startling reform process that has been underway since Shaykh Hamad ibn Khalifa
Al Thani (b. 1950) overthrew his father in June 1995. Elections have been held to the
formerly appointed Chamber of Commerce and to student bodies, and the media
have unprecedented freedom. The amir has said this election is but a Òtest stopÓ on
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the way to full constitutional rule.131 It is also striking that, despite some religious-
based opposition, many Islamists have specifically approved of the right of women
to vote and hold office. This, notably, was the position of the local branch of the
Muslim Brotherhood, echoing the IkhwanÕs position in Egypt and Jordan. Ma¼mun
al-Hudaybi said: ÒThere is nothing in Islam that prevents women from participat-
ing in the elections and being a member of parliament; thus there is a role for
women in all aspects of life, side by side with menÓ.132 The 1999 election is an inte-
gral part of, and substantial boost to, this evolving participatory political process. 
T u r k e y
The situation in Turkey is certainly different. A society with an intermittently func-
tioning democracy, it has seen a number of religion based partiesÑvariations on a
themeÑcompete for power and other parties make explicit and implicit appeals
based on Islam. Ne ücmettin Erbakan (b. 1926) even became the first Islamist prime
minister in June 1996 when he replaced his coalition partner, Tansu üCiller (b. 1946)
of the True Path Party (Doÿgru Yol Partisi). In an earlier incarnation133, Refah Partisi
(Welfare Party) had regularly secured between six and seven percent of the vote in
the 1980s when the very successful prime minister and president Turgut zal
(1927Ð1993) and even a section of the military had advocated ways of integrating
Islam into the national life.134 By the early 1990s Refah had broadened its base,
securing control of key cities such as Istanbul and Ankara in the local elections of
1994. In the December 1995 parliamentary election, with the vote fractured along
several lines, it garnered 21.38 percent of the vote and entered government. 
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RefahÕs success was to prove short lived, however. The military, self-appointed
guardians of the Kemalist legacy of laicism, became increasingly nervous, and on
28 February 1997 effectively served notice that it would not tolerate Islamist poli-
cies. In May 1997, the government closed Refah, and under such pressure, Erbakan
resigned in June. In January 1998, the Constitutional Court proscribed the party
for Òanti-secular activitiesÓ and prohibited Erbakan and other leaders from politi-
cal activity for five years.1 3 5 The popular mayor of Istanbul, Tayyip Erdogan, was
imprisoned and banned for life from political activism. Yet the movement dis-
played some resilience when it re-emerged as the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), and
although it placed only third in the parliamentary election of April 1999 and its
share of the vote declined to 15 percent, it secured 105 out of the 550 seats. 
During the eighteen months it was part of the ruling coalition, Refah pursued
unexpected policies. Erbakan visited Iran and Libya as part of his Islamic-orient-
ed foreign policy, and argued that the European Union and United Nations were
Zionist organisations. Yet despite his pan-Islamic and anti-Western rhetoric, he
also tolerated the Turkish-Israeli security arrangement and supported NATO.
Although there was talk of a new social welfare-oriented, vaguely socialist Just
Order (Adil Duzen), he adopted liberal economic policies with ties to the much
criticised International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Moreover, Òmore state
enterprises and lands were sold off under the Welfare coalition than under any
governmentÓ. It officially endorsed secularism and spoke of the values of the
ÒcentreÓ, with an emphasis on human rights and democracy.1 3 6 It may be argued
that this was due to such structural constraints as the paramount position of the
military, the need to maintain a coalition, and the ever-present competition for
ÒMuslim votesÓ with other major political parties.1 3 7 In this interpretation, the
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conversion was more tactical than strategicÑin effect if not also in intention a
kind of political t a q i y y a (religiously sanctioned dissimulation). Clearly, as in Jor-
dan since 1989, much of what has emerged has been the result of intricate
manoeuvring and careful bargaining among the major political groups. 
The extent to which a feedback effect has induced an internalisation of par-
ticipatory and pluralist values is, as always, difficult to ascertain. Erdogan
famously remarked: ÒDemocracy is sometimes seen as a means and sometimes
as an end É We see it only as a means. Whatever is the system that you want to
establish, it is a means to elect that systemÓ.1 3 8 In light of such overt instrumen-
talism, the democratic bona fides of Refah/Fazilet have understandably been called
into question. However, responding to this general view and specific military
claims that Fazilet made possible the climate in which an extreme group, Hizbul-
lah, allegedly committed atrocities,1 3 9 one Istanbul leader said: ÒIt is nonsense
because we strongly support the ideas of democracy and human rightsÓ.1 4 0 I n
1993, furthermore, Refah endorsed the concept of Òmultiple legal ordersÓ. Admit-
tedly of limited practical application in a society in which almost everyone is a
Muslim and who would therefore presumably be subject to the s h a r i»a, it repre-
sents nonetheless a degree of sensitivity to the issue of minority rights. Abdullah
Gl, unsuccessful contender for the leadership of Fazilet and a reformer whose
wife wears traditional dress, has said: ÒWe donÕt want to force people to wear
headscarves, we want to make it free. ItÕs up to individual desireÓ.1 4 1 In addition,
GlÕs reformist wing, which includes Erdogan, stresses that entrenched national
problems like Kurdish autonomy can only be resolved through democratic
means. Conceiving of an Islamist party in the European Christian Democratic
mould, it accepts the separation of religion and politics1 4 2 and believes that inter-
nal party democracy is the natural complement of national democracy. This wing
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did not secure control of Fazilet in its first national congress in May 2000, but,
significantly, won 45 percent of the delegatesÕ support. Even the successful, pro-
Erbakan wing (led by Recai Kutan) framed its position in terms of engagement
with the democratic process: ÒWe are a protest against the shortfalls in democ-
racy. The Virtue Party is the sole and joint vote of protest in TurkeyÓ.1 4 3
C o nc l u s i o n
If we were to pose the basic question, why have elections occurred in the Muslim
world, the theoretical literature suggests several possible answers: the process of
modernisation has created new social conditions conducive to greater pluralism
and political participation; elites have chosen strategies of power-sharing to
manage change and maintain their own grip on power; and long-term structur-
al changes such as of class, state, and international power provide constraints
that force the emergence of new political orders.1 4 4 The above discussion has
referred in various indirect ways to all three approaches, and it has thus situat-
ed electoral participation in a political calculus that is neither wholly subservient
to outside forces nor simply disingenuous and manipulative. 
Three broad conclusions follow from this discussion. First, if, as a part of the
conventional literature holds, elections are a function of modernisation,1 4 5 s o m e-
thing like the obverse may be equally, if not more, true. In a way, it is unwise to
use the term ÒmodernisationÓ itself, for it has largely been discredited in recent
social science because of its purported secular and Western political biases and
its distorting interpretation of tradition.1 4 6 Some may also take cultural offence
at the presumed suggestion that Muslims need to look outside their own tradi-
tions and become ÒmodernisedÓ in order to have Òproper electionsÓ.1 4 7 F u r t h e r-
4 3
1 4 3 . I b i d. 
1 4 4 . These, in turn, have been called the modernisation, transition, and structural approaches. For
a concise review of their differences, see: David Potter, ÒExplaining DemocratizationÓ, in David
Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh, and Paul Lewis (eds.), D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n (Milton Keynes:
Polity Press, 1997), pp. 10Ð24. 
1 4 5 . See, for example: ÒEpilogue: Comparative Politics in the Middle EastÓ, in Landau, zbudun and
Tachau (eds.), Electoral Politics in the Middle East, p. 321.
1 4 6 . See, for example: Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996), pp. 23Ð45.
1 4 7 . See, for example: Bobby Sayyid, ÒDemocracy and IslamismÓ, forum on Pluralism and Civil
Society (London: Islam 21, 2000): http://www.islam21.org/pages/keyissues/key3-8.html.
more, it is clear that the attributes associated with modernisation, such as
increased wealth, the emergence of middle classes, the rise of literacy, and the
growth of urbanism, do not automatically lead to democratisation. In fact, they
often enhance authoritarianism as elites find themselves facing significant polit-
ical and social challenges. But if we take the term to mean, broadly, greater dif-
ferentiation of political, economic, and social functions, modernisation has both
helped to make elections possible a n d been enhanced by the electoral experience. 
Making the point generally, context is important, and reflecting the transi-
tional nature of these societies, ÒtraditionalÓ and ÒmodernÓ have intimate inter-
connections. Patriarchal, patrimonial attitudes form an inescapable part of the
story, as does tribalism in some societies. Much of what has emerged has been
the result of intricate manoeuvring and careful bargaining among several
forcesÑruling elites, prominent families or ethnic groups, and Islamist move-
ments, to name but a few. Those who may be thought to be the natural benefi-
ciaries of elections, the better educated and employed, even sometimes view
them with suspicion. A 1999 poll among Palestinians, for example, suggests that
holders of university degrees and professionals were more likely to join HAMAS
supporters in refraining from participation in future elections for a Palestinian
president and Council than the illiterate and unemployed.1 4 8 On the other hand,
just as we would expect, the advent of mass education, the spread of literacy,
urbanisation, and rapid demographic growth have combined to encourage social
and political mobilisation. Wider elements have been incorporated into political
society. These notably include women, although the case of Kuwait, where an
intransigent national assembly in late 1999 stymied liberalising reform from
above that would have allowed women to vote in future elections, reminds us of
the entrenched difficulties. 
My point is that the ÒmodernisationÓ-elections relationship does not move in
one direction only. Elections are made possible to some extent by social and polit-
ical openings and increased economic complexity. By the same token, however,
they also have a ramifying impact on that changing social tableau. To the extent
that elections assume a defined place in a political society such as Iran, Jordan,
Lebanon, or Egypt and to the extent that Islamists routinely participate in them,
they push the differentiation along and enhance structural pluralism. They may
do so in the name of defending tradition or by reconfirming the political salience
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of tribal and ethnic identifications. But as they become a normal fixture of the
political landscape, elections establish new, ÒmodernÓÑor, at least, alternativeÑ
standards of legitimacy that co-exist with other standards.
Second, elections facilitate the t r a n s i t i o n from authoritarianism and are not
simply one of the hallmarks of a stabilised or consolidated democratic regime.
They are themselves a transformative strategy. A ÒmatureÓ system ostensibly
finds in elections the formalisation and articulation of recognised group inter-
ests. But in societies in transition, such as the ones we have been discussing, elec-
tions crucially perform other functions: They formalise existing informal net-
works, in effect bringing new actors into the game; and they enmesh or entan-
gle these actors in the rules of a game of inter-group bargaining, even as they
may seek to subvert those rules. The entanglement and the bargaining are by no
means guaranteed to make democrats of the Islamists, but the short-term sta-
bility or the space that is created may leadÑthough it is by no means certainÑto
longer-term salutary results. The habitual patterns may well have a spill-over
effect. 
This process is possibly aided, ironically, by the innate conservatism of the tra-
ditional religious authorities such as the » u l a m a. Once Islamist groups are incor-
porated in the political game and parties are formalised, the religious officials
may well come to view them as the tolerable alternative to grass-roots Islamic
radicals. These radicals, after all, are censorious of both the religious and politi-
cal establishments. The competition for religious authority and the political
imperative of preserving oneÕs own power are important elements here. Through
the lending of well-timed support, religious arbiters may help to mitigate the
Òcommitment [to democracy] problemÓ of the newly incorporated Islamists.1 4 9
Structural factors and elite choice are thus relevant.
Third, political culture is also likely to be a critical factor in determining
whether the electoral involvement of Islamists will prove to be transformative.
Fragmentation of authority, as just noted, may impel religious elites to endorse
more moderate Islamists over radical ones. As was suggested earlier, it may work
as well in favour of creating a vitally important de facto political pluralism. Such
structural pluralism can, furthermore, create initial political openings or liber-
alisation, and the self-interest of groups, including regimes, may lie in devising
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power-sharing arrangements. Structural and utilitarian considerations are thus
important; to use the provocative formulation, democracy without democrats
becomes possible. At the same time, the normative dimension does not seem
irrelevant to the process of democratic development, but this takes us into uncer-
tain territory. Indeed, in making the case for the normative roots of democracy,
one can easily fall into essentialist or reductionist readings of Islamic public cul-
ture, such as Orientalism or, indeed, the view of those who regard Islamism as
inherently antagonistic to democracy. There is particular danger in ascribing a
generic character type or mentality to Muslims, of overstating the importance of
tribalism and patrimonialism, and assuming that Muslims always act out of
expressly religious motivations.1 5 0
However, should we, as Michael Hudson asks,1 5 1 throw out the political cul-
tural baby with the Orientalist bathwater? It would, to my mind, be inadvisable
because cultures are not monolithic or homogeneous; they are made up of a vari-
ety of strands of thought and multiple interpretations, as we have seen with
regard to Muslim thought on elections. In addition, cultures change over time.
Ideas concerning, for example, nationalism, popular participation, and social jus-
tice are not stagnant, and Qur¼anic meanings are nothing if not ambiguous. Con-
trary to what may have been expected, as has been noted, ideas of popular sov-
ereignty now coexist with the concept of divine sovereignty in modern Islamic
political thought. It is probably the case that indigenous notions such as s h u r a
and i j m a » Òdo not comprise a compelling theory of governmentÓ.1 5 2 But they do
provide the intellectual foundation for the metaphorical extension of Islamic
ideas into the ÒmodernÓ realmÑin short, and despite what many conservative
Muslims would themselves say, the reinterpretation of doctrine. Religious belief
is thus relevant to the process of electoral participation and democratisation, and
it is contingent.
As has been argued, a long history of normative evolution has provided the
backdrop for current thinking in the Muslim world on elections and democracy.
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Roots go into the nineteenth century with critical reforms in both Ottoman
Turkey of the Tanzimat period and Iran of the Constitutional Revolution period.
Many Muslims responded to the imperialist encroachment by professing similar
viewpoints to those of the West, in part to affirm the political equality of their
countries, in part as a consequence of an unconscious intellectual adaptation.
But there were opponents and, in truth, dissenting views attained considerable
prominence. Rejection of the idea of elections has been framed in terms of spe-
cific objection to the associated notions of constitutionalism, popular sovereign-
ty, majority rule, and equality. These are powerful arguments, and it is under-
standable why some observers today believe that Muslims are constrained by a
weighty intellectual inheritance and regard whatever electoral participation has
occurred as superficial tactical manoeuvring. 
Two factors may be set against this interpretation, however. First, as we have
seen, several schools of thought have emerged on the question of elections, and
ideas are constantly being defined and refined according to shifting circum-
stances. Although debate continues over majoritarian v e r s u s ÒproportionalÓ ruleÑ
that is, the degree of domination and inclusiveness of political groups1 5 3Ñthe dis-
agreement is over the kind of electoral system, not whether elections are desirable
in the first place. Moreover, IslamismÑthe current experience that has become
the testing case for all Muslim moral and practical virtueÑinvolves a diversity of
groups whose activities and means span a broad spectrum. It is thus a simplifica-
tion to suggest, as the following quotation does, that the fundamentalistsÕ version
of Islam is unwaveringly intransigent: ÒThey regard liberal democracy with con-
tempt as a corrupt and corrupting form of government. They are willing to see it,
at best, as an avenue to power, but an avenue that runs one way onlyÓ.1 5 4
Second, practical experience reinforces the discursive shift that often pre-
cedes it, and may lead, over time, to an internalisation of the underlying values
to which the discourse refers. The language of rights, pluralism, and participa-
tion has been present for some time in the Muslim world, and as elections occur
they confirm these ideas as standards of legitimacy and delegitimisation. As the
same time, they may help to promote a sense of commitment to the ideas. In
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short, historical experience has an effect on the reinterpretation of Muslim
thought and beliefs in this domain. Putting it in the context of negotiated poli-
tics, the experience helps Muslims and especially Islamists to accept the ÒspiritÓ,
and not just the ÒlogicÓ, of the rules of the game.1 5 5
Bassam Tibi remains dubious that pragmatism is equivalent to real intellectu-
al adaptation.1 5 6 But utilitarian concerns do not necessarily preclude an intellec-
tual evolution in the direction of the practical imperative. IntentionÑan area of
immense obscurity to social scientistsÑdoes not necessarily predetermine effect,
and accumulated social practice, mediated by evolving circumstances and a range
of cultural and political institutions and authorities, may produce unanticipated
consequences. Though referring to a completely different context and speaking of
subjectivities rather than beliefs, Lila Abu-Lughod makes the general point about
adaptive process well: Ò[T]elevison serials in Egypt, while perhaps failing in their
self-appointed missions of inculcating values of nationalism and feminism
through their overt messages, may nevertheless, and quite inadvertentlyÑ
through the subtle effects of their generic conventionsÑbe making it possible for
those values to make senseÓ.1 5 7 The discussion of this paper has suggestedÑtenta-
tivelyÑthat the radical separation of instrumental and principled attachment to
elections may be overstated. Electoral participation creates its own inner logic, or
rules of the game, that entangle or enmesh the participants further. 
This is not to suggest that escape from this involvement is impossible, or that
acceptance of the rules is universal. Much of the evolution that has been
described will seem minimalist and the pace of change glacial. It has often been
remarked that the fundamental democratic requirement is the commitment to
achieving power only via free elections and the willingness to relinquish power
to others similarly inclined and elected. By this standard of commitment, many
Islamist groups are sadly lacking. In addition, the associated value of equality of
participation often appears to be a distant goal. Indeed, the internal Others of
women, minorities, and political opponents are likely to be the litmus test of
whether democratic values have been adopted. Even the liberal Muhammad
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Asad, endorsing female suffrage, could not bring himself to admit that non-Mus-
lim minorities should have an equal share in the Islamic order.1 5 8
The evolving public culture of Islam is clearly not isolated from important
problems: 
Ð Electoral politics are largely class-based, encouraged by the intelligentsia and
new middle classes but scarcely incorporating the masses.
Ð Governments, and specifically militaries, still control and manipulate the
process, redefining the rules of the game for obvious advantage. For instance,
the Jordanian government in 1993 adopted a Òone person, one voteÓ system in
the hope of maximising the victory of compliant tribal elements, and the Turk-
ish military forced the ouster of Refah and remain uneasy about Fazilet. More-
over, regimes sometimes see elections as a way for opponents to let off steam,159
or as a way to promote a loyal opposition that could be contrasted with disloy-
al elements. To the extent that elections are perceived as subject to manipula-
tion (tala»ub) or as merely cosmetic, they are likely to make matters worse by
undermining faith in democratic procedures and encouraging radicals.
Ð Islamist parties, even when they participate in the game and seek broad sup-
port, cannot stray too far from their ideologically committed base. This built-
in tension may impel them towards both political progressivismÑparticipa-
tion in electionsÑand, with an eye on their core constituency, social conser-
vatism. The schizophrenic consequence could ultimately destabilise Islamist
movements and undermine their engagement with participatory politics. 
Ð The authoritarian internal practices of many Islamist groups, like other polit-
ical parties in the Middle East, may exacerbate tensions among members and
discourage the broader commitment to principles of pluralism and alterna-
tion of power.1 6 0
4 9
1 5 8 . Asad, The Principles of State and Government in Islam, pp. 40Ð41.
1 5 9 . For example, Henry Munson, Jr. argues that this is what occurred in the Moroccan elections of
1993: ÒThe Elections of 1993 and Democratization in MoroccoÓ, in Rahma Bourgia and Susan
Gilson Miller (eds.), In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power and Politics in Morocco, Harvard
Middle East Monograph XXXI (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies,
Harvard University, 1999), pp. 273Ð277. 
1 6 0 . Jillian Schwedler, ÒA Paradox of Democracy? Islamist Participation in ElectionsÓ, Middle East
R e p o r t, number 209 (Winter 1998), pp. 28Ð29. Kalyvas presents the alternative view that
corporatist and internally policed organisations are disciplined enough to make external
compromises and to keep spoiling, violent dissidents in check: ÒCommitment Problems in
Emerging DemocraciesÓ, p. 393.
Ð Factors outside the country skew the internal balance. Regimes are impelled to
open the political system in the hope of winning financial and political favour
from international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank or from Western governments. Yet, equally, the distortions of
globalised economic relations may reinforce internal authoritarianism as lib-
erties are sacrificed, with the complicity of multinational corporations, in
order to guarantee reliable economic performance in the ÒperipheryÓ. 
The imperfection of elections can, however, be overstated, reinforcing what has
been called the Òelectoralist fallacyÓ.1 6 1 Sceptics of the democratic progress of the
Muslim world often make too much of electoral failings and, in fact, overem-
phasise the significance of elections themselves. In essence, they regard them as
sufficient for democratisation, rather than as only necessary. Elections are not by
themselves the test of democracy. Nevertheless, they are consequential. If, as Lisa
Anderson suggests, it is important to see what actually exists rather than to spec-
ulate on what is absent in Islam or Muslim societies, as much of the analysis of
democratisation in the Muslim world has tended to do,1 6 2 then elections are a
striking presence. It is also noteworthy that Muslim experience is less excep-
tional than has often been assumed. The electoral politics of Muslim societies are
not radically different from what has occurred elsewhere, although the terms of
the discourse naturally relate to a culturally specific vocabulary. 
The tableau is evolving, and final judgement depends on whether one regards
the glass as half empty or half full. As this analysis has argued, grounds for qual-
ified optimism lie in increasing Muslim and Islamist acceptance of the electoral
principle. This, in turn, may signal a more inclusive politics in the Middle East.
Elections may thus not be the guarantor of democratisation, but they are likely
to be an important transitional phenomenon.
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